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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
RICHARD I. CINTRON, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 19149 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted of the charge of Aggravated Robbery and 
Aggravated Burglary felonies of the first degree in the District Court 
for the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term 
as provided by law of not less than five (5) but which may be for life 
after a jury found him guilty of both offenses. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment rendered, or in the 
alternative a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant, herein, with Joseph James Price, was accused of 
burglarizing and robbing William E. Parker at his residence at 11760 South 
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State Street, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the of July, 1982. 
It was alleged that the defendants, in the early morning hours of that 
day, broke into Mr. Parker's residence, blindfolded and held him at knife 
point while they ransacked the house taking various items of property. 
(T. Vol I pg 12) 
Appellant was identified as the result of having prior contact 
with the victim who was able to identify him from a photographic lineup 
conducted by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. None of the property 
allegedly stolen was recovered, identified or connected with the appellant. 
(T. Vol I pg 44) 
At the trial of the matter, the State of Utah presented the 
evidence of Mr. Parker's identification. Appellant produced two witnesses 
whose testimony attempted to establish an alibi for the date and time of the 
offense. In rebuttal to that testimony and over objection, (T. Vol I pg 169) 
the State of Utah produced Detective Dick Forbes, Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office, regarding such witnesses (T. Vol I pg 171). Appellant had duly 
filed a Notice of Alibi but had not received any Notice regarding the testimony 
of Forbes. 
Appellant testified in his own behalf (T. Vol I pg 141). During 
the course of cross-examination, the Deputy County Attorney inquired, over 
objection, whether he had been convicted of a misdemeanor (T. Vol I pg 152). 
Appellant responded that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor theft in a 
Salt Lake County Justice of the Peace Court subsequent to the date of this 
alleged offense. 
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Co-defendant, Joseph James Price, was represented by Jo Carol 
Nessett-Sale. During the course of closing argument Ms. Nessett-Sale 
argued that it was her opinion that appellant Richard I. Cintron had 
corrunitted the crime and that one of the alibi witnesses, James McCall, 
matched the description of the co-perpetrator. Such arguments were made 
over ejection. (T. Vol II pg 34-37 and 38) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A VERDICT. 
The evidence at trial consisted of the identification by the 
victim Parker. He testified that in the early morning hours he was awakend 
by his dog and went to the back door (T. Vol I pg 14). He turned on the 
kitchen and porch light. Looking through some sheers covering the window 
in his back door he observed a person on the porch. Opening the door 
slightly he inquired as to the purpose for that person knocking and yelling. 
The door was then shoved open knocking Mr. Parker on his back. A person 
identified as Joseph James Price then went through the door and threatend 
the victim with a knife which was placed at his throat. He was then blind-
folded and transported to a different room where he was held while the 
perpetrators of the offense ransacked his house. (T. Vol I pg 18) 
Mr. Parker testified that he had observed Joseph James Price 
as the result of the incident with the knife aided by the lighting in the 
kitchen (1. Vol 1 pg 19-20). He further testified that he observed the 
appPllant, herein, as the result of observing him briefly through the sheers 
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aided by the light from the kitchen and purch 
that he was not wearing his glasses (1. Voll pg JY). Furthc-r, Lt was 
established that the lighting on the porch was behind the person who was 
at the back door (T. Vol l pg 37). Mr. Parker testified that he had observed 
the appellant on three prior occasions when appellant had come to his house 
with a request to purchase some gasoline and on subsequent occasions to talk 
(T. Vol l pg 15). These prior occurrences were brief and without incident. 
During the course of the robbery Mr. Parker testified that he 
heard the "blond man" identified as Price, call the other man "Gary". 
(T. Vol l pg 23) He also testified that he heard the term "Rich" used. 
Although Mr. Parker was clear that the name "Gary" referred to the other 
man, circumstances were such that it was unclear whether the word "Rich" 
was used as a name. That confusion was apparent because the victim did 
not hear how the term was used in the conversation. It was spoken as a 
whisper and after Mr. Parker had been tied, gagged and bleeding for some period 
of time. (T. Vol l pg 48-50) 
ln defense, appellant presented two witnesses, Sidney Hatcher 
(T. Vol l pg 125) and Jarues (T. Vol l pg 153). They testified that, 
at the time and date of the offense, they were with appellant at the residence 
of Sidney Hatcher. All three men had been drinking heavily through the day 
and in the early morning hours had gone tu sleep in the Hat'-' her camper. 
It is proper that this Court rt.'View the evidt:nce submitt'2J ln 
the trial to determine wl1ether it W3S sufficient t0 su11p0rt a 0f 
guilty. It is difficult for revie\..'lng Cvurts to ::;e(unU 5\1.._·ss a Jury which 
has, having heard the evidence, founJ guilty 
could come to an opposite conclusion from the jury. This Court's review 
of the evidence is different because it is a review from a transcript 
with sufficient time to examine and compare the evidence and testimony. 
1his Court is also able to more meticulously apply the legal standards of 
proof and presumptions in its review of the evidence. Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160: "If the evidence with respect to any defense ... is 
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, he 
should be acquitted". State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Ut 1977): "It must 
appear that upon so reviewing the evidence, reasonable minds must necessarily 
entertain a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a 
State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Ut 1975): "For defendant to prevail upon 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, 
it must appear that viewing the evidence and all inferences that may reasonably 
be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury, 
reasonable minds could not believe him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 
at page 1272. 
The State 1 s evidence rested solely on Parker's identification. 
There was no other evidence linking appellant to the crime. 1here were no 
fingerprints or other physical evidence. There were no other witnesses who 
observed any part of the incident. No stolen property was recovered or con-
nected to appellant. 
Parker's identification was fraught with reasonable doubt because 
of the circumstances of the viewing. Parker had been sleeping, and had a brief 
view of appellant prior to being assaulted by the person identified as 
Joseph James Price. The lighting was such that no clear view of the defendant 
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could have been made. Parker was looking through sheers over his back window. 
The lighting on the porch was behind the person and Mr. Parker did not 
have his glasses on. The man was referred to as '1Gary 11 with confusion as 
to whether he had also been called "Rich". 
Combine those circumstances with the testimony of two witnesses 
who established appellant's presence in another location and it must be 
concluded that there was reasonable doubt and reasonable minds should have 
had that reasonable doubt. 
POINT II 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE PROSECUTOR TO INQUIRE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
MISDEMEANOR CONVICTION. 
The question here ivolves the perameters whereby the 
prosecuting attorney may inquire of a defendant, who is testifying, regarding 
prior convictions of misdemeanors. 
The State of Utah relies on Rule 21, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
for the proposition that the testifying defendant may be asked regarding 
convictions for crimes involving dishonesty and false statement even if they 
are misdemeanors. Appellant, herein, had been convicted of a misdemeanor 
theft in a Justice of the Peace Court in Salt Lake County. He had entered 
a plea to such offense subsequent to his arrest for aggravated robbery and 
burglary which were the subject matter of the trial. The prosecutor maintained 
that a theft conviction involved dishonesty as defined by the rule. 
78-24-9, Utah Code Annotated as amended), allows the prosecutor 
to ask regarding the defendant's prior record only to the extent of a felony 
conviction. The statute provides: 
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''A witness must answer questions legal and pertinent to the 
matter in issue, although his answer may establish a claim 
against himself; but he need not give an answer which will 
have a tendency to subject him to punishment for a felony; 
nor need he give an answer which will have a direct tendency 
to degrade his character, unless it is to the very fact in 
issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be 
presumed. But a witness must answer as to the fact of his 
previous conviction a felony. 
In State v. Bennett, 517 P.2d 1029 (Ut 1973), the defendant was 
required to answer to a prior conviction of a felony and to tell the jury 
that the conviction was for a second degree murder. The issue in that case 
was whether the State properly asked as to the particulars of the felony 
conviction. This Court concluded: 
"Rule 21 by its terms does not apply where a statute otherwise 
applies; and since the statute does otherwise provide, there 
was no error in requiring the defendant to answer to his 
prior conviction of murder in the second degree." 1031. 
In most of the decisions decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 
this regard, the issues have involved the extent to which the prosecutor 
may inquire into a felony conviction. The arguments have revolved around 
questions by the prosecutor regarding the circumstances of the crime committed 
or the plea entered on a felony conviction. It would seem however, that the 
rule that one may not inquire into a conviction other than felony is established. 
Refer State v. Kazda, 382 P.2d 402 (Ut 1963), State v. Dickson, 361 P.2d 
412 (Ut 1961), State v. Roberts, 612 P.2d 360 (Ut 1980), State v. Mccumber, 
622 P.2d 353 (Ut 1980). 
Appellant would urge this Court to conclude that where the statute, 
in this case, 78-24-9, restricts the inquiry of the prosecutor to felony 
convictions, no rule of evidence can expand the examination to include a 
misdemeanor. 
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The language of Rule 21 does not L'XpauJ tht> st.:.itutory restriction 
but may be interpreted as adding a further limitation to statute. 
That is to say that Rule 21 is more restrictive than the statute. Rule 21 
provides: 
"Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime nut 
involving dishonesty or false statement shall be inadmis-
sible for the purpose of impairing his credibility except 
as otherwise provided by statute." 
As the rule is in the negative it should be interpreted as not 
only restricting inquiry of prior convictions to felonies but requiring 
that those felonies involve false statement or dishonesty. Rather than 
expanding the rule as argued by the State to include felonies and crimes 
of dishonesty and false statement, it restricts the types of felonies 
about which the prosecutor may ask. 
Therefore, under either approach the prosecutor should not have 
been permitted to ask about the misdemeanor conviction. Either the Rule of 
Evidence is precluded by statute from being interpreted as allowing such 
a line of questioning or the Rule of Evidence is more narrow and restrictive 
in relation to the statute and only provides for questions about convictions 
of felonies involving dishonesty or false statement. 
The prejudice of such an inquiry is evident. Where the case 
involves an eyewitness and a defendant's denial, the credibility uf the 
witness in making the denial is essential. Any evidenc2 whicl1 is elicted 
from the witness tending to detract from tlis credibility goes to heart 
of his testimony. If that is improperly or into 
subject matters not allowed by the ar1J it is to 
the extreme. 
-8-
POINT Ill 
TilAT IT WAS FOR CO-COUNSEL, IN CLOSING ARGUMENT, TO ARGUE HER OPINION 
REGARD ING APPELLANT'S GUILT. 
In closing argument, Jo Carol Nessett-Sale, attorney for co-
defendant, Joseph James Price, over objection, commented upon the States 
case against defendant Cintron and his relation to a witness, James McCall, 
who testified as an alibi witness for appellant. It was Ms. Nessett-Sale's 
line of argument that the State had established, through strong evidence, 
that Cintron had indeed committed the offense. McCall matched closely 
the description of the co-perpetrator; that is young, blonde with receeding 
hairline. It was Ms. Nessett-Sale's approach that the evidence against 
Cintron was strong and consequently, if we believed McCall, that he was 
with Cintron, it would necessarily follow that McCall was the co-perpetrator 
of the offense. Counsel, in essence, not only gave her opinion regarding 
the evidence, but indicated that she knew things which the jury was not privy 
to and consequently set herself up as offering an opinion based on personal 
knowledge. 
"Then we have the issue of the co-defendant here. You know and 
the judge has indicated that these men are to be treated 
separately and certainly my job is to defend and my privilege is 
to defend Joe Price. It is not to prosecute anyone else. But 
we can't help but observe that if one of the two men here today 
charged with this crime is a robber, you know who it is and it 
is not JoePrice."(T. Vol 2 pg 34-35) 
"When I heard Dick Forbes, from the Prosecutor's Office, 
that according to his conversation with Mr. Hatcher, the 
landlord, the last time he saw Richard Cintron was at 
3:00 a.m. in the morning when he left he and Mr. McCall out in 
the camper drinking and when Mr. McCall walked in, I about 
dropped. I know that you noticed that he was a blonde man with 
a mustache who could be my client's brother. I looked at him, a 
man I had never seen before, and I thought, 11 My god, I wish 
Mr. Parker \.Jere here. I wish he could see this man." Because 
if Mr. Cintron was with Mr. Hatcher and Mr. McCall all that night 
moving and was with him the next morning at 9:00 a.m. and 
were drinking in the camper until 3: 00 in the rnorn1ng, 
then who is the likely blonde who was with Mr. Cintron 
if Mr. Cintron was the man who did the robbery? Who? Is 
Mr. McCall brazen enough to walk into this Court and to 
provide an alibi for his robber companion? Well, we have 
never said that crooks were very bright." (T. Vol 2, pg 35-36) 
In Workman v. Henrie, 266 P. 1033 (Ut 1928), there were comments 
by counsel that he had personal knowledge of the credibility of certain 
witnesses and the believeability of their version of the circumstances. 
In that case, however, it was determined not to be error because the court 
instructed the jury to disregard such a line of argument as counsel had not 
been called as a witness and had not testified. The court inquired of opposing 
counsel whether anything else could be done to correct the situation. Opposing 
counsel offered no further argument or suggestion regarding instruction 
or procedures in which the Court could engage to correct the situation 
In this present situation there lS a similiarity to a prosecutor 
making exactly the same type of comments. This lS not a case in which co-
defendant Price, having knowledge that the offense was committed by Cintron 
offered that testimony and maintained his innocence. Rather, Price maintained 
that he knew nothing of the offense and it was his counsel, in closing arguments, 
which alluded to the guilt of appellant and attempted to offer her own opinion 
regarding how the offense was committed suggesting the co-perpetrator was the 
alibi witness. 
Except for the standard instruction that argument of counsel was 
not evidence the Court made no attempt to correct the situation. Counsel was 
permitted to continue this line of argument and observation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant urges this Court to the conclusion that the evidence at 
trial was insufficient because there was no evidence corroborating the victim 
Parker's identification which was fraught with circumstances leading to reason-
able doubt. The prosecutor's case was further weakend by the presentation 
of alibi witness' in defense of appellant. 
The Utah Rules and statutes do not provide for inquiry into con-
victions of misdemeanors and consequently the prosecutor's question regarding 
appellant's conviction of misdemeanor theft was improper. Such an error 
was prejudicial because it went to the heart of the defendant's case in 
challenging his credibility. 
Co-Counsel's closing argument was improper because it set her up 
as offering an opinion regarding appellant's guilt and inferred knowledge of 
which the jury was not aware without being called as a 
(y 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of 
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and testifying. 
1983. 
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